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I
INTRODUCTION

Although they operate within some legislatively imposed constraints on their
powers of review, appellate courts basically control the timing, the standards, and
the scope of review of trial court decisions. By these means of control, appellate
courts effectively order the ongoing functional relationship between the trial and
appellate levels of a judicial system. The resulting jurisprudence of appellate practice and procedure is obviously an important body of adjective law, but it is a
surprisingly unsystematic and relatively obscure one. Only in the aspect touching
the timing of interlocutory review-the appealability of nonfinal orders-is there a
fairly well-developed and readily accessible jurisprudence comparable to that
developed in most areas of trial court procedure.
The other two aspects (those concerned with the standards and scope of
review) represent the two dimensions which actually define the appellate review
function at large. Standards of review-"clear error," abuse of discretion, and de
novo review, for example-define the depth or intensity with which trial court
rulings of fact, law, and discretion are subjected to review. Scope of reviewwhich specific trial court actions or omissions are properly subject to review on a
given appeal-defines the breadth of the review function.
As between the latter two aspects of the review function, the jurisprudence of
standards is relatively the more systematically developed and accessible. The jurisprudence of scope is the least systematically developed and readily accessible of the
three aspects.
It is to that least developed aspect that this article is devoted. The overall purpose is to outline the main features of this basically obscure body of appellate
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procedural law and to identify its more obvious policy- and value-related underpinnings. Though not peculiar to the federal system, for purposes of simplicity the
subject is discussed mainly as it is encountered in that most representative and
generally applicable American system.
II
THE FORMAL DESIGN FOR LIMITING SCOPE

Scope is ultimately controlled by consideration of the specific functions that
appellate courts serve. While there have been various formulations, most who
have thought systematically about the matter identify the following two basic
functions: (1) correction of error (or declaration that no correction is required) in
the particular litigation; and (2) declaration of legal principle, by creation, clarification, extension, or overruling.' These are, in Dean Pound's terms, respectively
2
the corrective and preventive functions.
In the discharge of these basic functions several others of subsidiary but significant importance also are served. Among them are (a) ensuring principled decisionmaking in the trial courts; (b) diffusing accountability within the legal system;
(c) ensuring uniformity of principle; and (d) making justice "visible" through the
reasoned opinion.
The "proper" scope of review depends to a considerable extent upon one's view
of the relative importance of the two basic functions. To the extent the corrective
function is emphasized, scope will tend toward the narrow; to the extent the preventive, law-giving function is emphasized, it will tend toward the wide. The
system itself is slanted by formal design toward the more constrictive attitude
emphasizing the corrective function. This reflects an historical preference for law's
3
rather than equity's choice of the appropriate scope of appellate review.
In the evolution of our contemporary legal systems, we have borrowed from
both sources. From the appeal in equity has come the notion that appellate review
is simply a continuation of the same action rather than, as at law, a new proceeding against the trial judge or his judgment. But from the proceeding in error
at law has come the notion that the appellate court's function is not, as in equity,
de novo review to give a right judgment on the same record, but is merely to correct
errors of the trial court.
Strict adherence to the formal design that has developed would limit appellate
review to the consideration of (1) specific first instance trial court actions or omissions (2) properly suggested as error to the trial court (3) and then properly
presented for review to the appellate court (4) by an aggrieved party. The limitation on scope implied in (1) is realized by application of such judicial rules as that
prohibiting "changing theories on appeal ' 4 and that prohibiting the exercise of
1. See, e.g., P.
2.
3.
4.
Corp.

CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-3 (1976).
R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 3 (1941).
For a discussion of the historical development of appellate procedure, see R. POUND, supra note 2.
See Snapp v. United States Postal Serv., 664 F.2d 1329, 1332 (5th Cir. 1982); Schwimmer v. Sony
of Am., 637 F.2d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1980); Cook v. City of Price, 566 F.2d 699, 702 (10th Cir. 1977);

Page 1: Spring 1984]

SCOPE OF REVIEW

"original" jurisdiction by appellate courts. 5 The limitation implied in (2) is
embodied in specific rules of trial court procedure such as the "contemporaneous
objection" requirements of Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 6 The limitation implied in
(3) is specifically embodied in Rules 28(a)(2) and 28(b) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which require that the issues for review be stated in briefs.
7
The limitation in (4) is embodied directly in "aggrieved party" decisional law.
This is the formal design, but the degree to which these limitations are actually
honored to control the scope of review in particular cases is of course up to the
appellate courts. Like other procedural rules, they may be stretched, qualified, or
utterly avoided when the values they embody are considered outweighed by other
values which the appellate courts also have a duty to safeguard. 8
The first purpose of this article is to identify the main values embodied in the
formal design and furthered by adherence to it, and to identify some of the countervailing values that may be subverted by strict adherence to the design. The
second purpose is to encourage some rumination about the proper judicial attitude
for confronting the question whether to adhere to the basic design.
III
THE PROBLEM:

To

ADHERE OR NOT TO ADHERE?

In many, presumably most, appeals, no problem is presented whether to
adhere rigidly to the formal design or to break through it. In these cases the dispositive issues on appeal have been clearly addressed in the trial court, errors
affecting their disposition have been properly suggested there, and the same errors
have been clearly assigned in a formal brief as the object of correction by the
appellate court. When this occurs, no conscious notice of the proper scope of
review is likely to be taken by the appellate court, and certainly no need exists
formally to justify the scope of review undertaken by recording in its written
opinion the technical basis for that review. But in other cases a problem is
presented: an impulse arises, or is induced, to consider an issue not addressed
below, or to correct an error in respect of an issue addressed below but not properly presented at one level or the other, or at either. When this occurs, what is the
appropriate judicial response? What are the factors that should determine a speKassman v. American Univ., 546 F.2d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Miller v. Avirom, 384
F.2d 319, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
5. United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 456 U.S. 926 (1982);
Miller v. Avirom, 384 F.2d 319, 321 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 119-20
(1976); Western Transp. Co. v. Webster City Iron & Metal Co., 657 F.2d 116, 119 (7th Cir. 1981); In re
Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1978); Terkildsen v. Waters, 481 F.2d 201, 204-05
(2d Cir. 1973).
6. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 51 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 (requirement that any objection to a jury
instruction be made before the jury retires to consider its verdict).
7.

See generally 9

J.

MOORE, B. WARD & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

203.06 (2d ed.

1983).
8. United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1045 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d
289, 291 (1st Cir. 1982); Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Transwestern Title Co., 630 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1980); In
re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1978). See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976).
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cific response? 9
This article attempts no specific or general answer to the first question. Too
much of inspired "judgment call" is rightly involved to make such an attempt
worthwhile. But it is possible to attempt identification of the conflicting values
properly to be considered by any appellate court facing the problem. Before doing
so, it seems not amiss to propose a general working hypothesis: No appellate court
should ever break through the formal design without taking conscious account of the conflitCing
values necessarily i'mplcated in the decisi'on to do so.
IV
VALUES PROTECTED BY ADHERENCE TO FORMAL DESIGN

As a prelude to identification of these values, it will help to recognize the various ways in which the problem of adherence to design arises: (1) a litigant fails to
advance a theory or to suggest error in the trial court, but does present the theory
or assign error on appeal; (2) a litigant properly advances a theory or suggests error
in the trial court but fails to present the theory or assign error on appeal; or (3) a
litigant fails to advance a theory or suggest error in the trial court and also fails to
present the theory or assign error on appeal. In (1), any impulse to break through
formal design is party induced; in (2) and (3), it can only arise sua sponte (or
possibly in response to a litigant's oral argument). Because different values are
served by the successive requirements for advancing theories and suggesting error
in the trial court and on appeal, the values properly to be taken into account in
any case will differ depending upon the way in which the problem arises.
The values protected by the formal design exist at two levels: some pertain
primarily to the particular litigation (litigation values); others pertain more
broadly to ongoing concerns of the justice system (system values). Both are
obvious upon reflection and may be quickly summarized.
A.

Litigation Values

Each rule limiting the scope of appellate review promotes specific values at the
heart of litigation. The scope-limiting rule that forbids consideration of theories or
issues not advanced in the trial court protects the adversary's opportunity to contest the theory or issue in the trial court, and promotes full development of a
record for review. The rule prohibiting consideration of error not suggested in the
trial court protects the following: the opportunity for correction or avoidance in
the trial court; the opportunity for avoidance of error by action of the adversary
(such as the withdrawal of a challenged question); the adversary's opportunity to
present a reasoned defense of the trial court's action; and, possibly, a full development of a record for review as when, for example, objection is made to the voir dire
required to establish an evidentiary foundation. Finally, forbidding consideration
9. For further discussion of the problem of adhering to the formal design, see Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (1958-59); Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review
will Consider Questions Not ProperlyRaisedand Preserved (pts. 1, 2 & 3), 7 Wis. L. REV. 91, 160 (1932), 8 Wis. L.
REV. 147 (1933).
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5

of issues not presented on appeal ensures the adversary fair notice and an opportunity to contest, and promotes full development of the issues by partisan
presentation.
B.

System Values

System values are more subtle, but may be more important in the final analysis
than any of the specific litigation values. They can only be suggested, not being
susceptible of precise demonstration. They are associated with the integrity of the
adversary system, the integrity of trial court processes, and the moral authority
and psychological support of the trial bench.
Every departure from a scope-limiting rule requiring party action at either
level to preserve an issue for review undercuts the adversarial process to some
extent. The bar is given a signal about the seriousness with which the party presentation rules are taken, and sloppiness may be encouraged. Precedent is set.
Hard cases thus may make bad law that is difficult to undo.
Every departure from a scope-limiting rule requiring party action in the trial
court may subvert the efforts of the trial bench to demand observance of the rules.
To the extent theories not advanced in the trial court are drawn upon to decide
cases on appeal, the division of functions between the two levels of courts is compromised. All such departures may have a tendency to subvert the moral
authority of the trial bench-to some extent with the public, and, to a more certain and worrisome extent, with the practicing bar. Something different from
reversing or remanding for an error or omission clearly suggested to the trial judge
is involved when this species of subversion occurs.
V
COUNTERVAILING VALUES

There is of course another side to this. There are powerful countervailing
values that may justify departure from the design in particular cases.
These too are subtle and hard to demonstrate with precision through specific
case examples, but again they are obvious upon reflection. They may be summarized under two headings: (1) avoiding unjust results in the particular case; and
(2) seizing an opportunity for needed announcement or clarification of legal principle, either for guidance in further proceedings in the same case or for general
precedential purposes. 10

10. A third category might also be thought worthy of inclusion. Appellate courts sometimes decide a
dispositive issue of law not raised below or on appeal simply in the interest of expeditious resolution of the
case. The alternative, of course, is remand for first instance consideration in the trial court, with or without
directions.
An interesting recent example of this departure from design (which, incidentally, provoked a dissent) is
found in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 927, 944 (1983).
Also interesting was the Court's resort to the general review powers conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976),
as a legislatively created source of federal appellate power to depart from design.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

A.

[Vol. 47: No. 2

Avoiding the Unjust Result

In the simplest kind of case, an appellant assigns on appeal specific, narrow
error that was not properly suggested in the trial court-erroneous admission of
evidence, failure to direct a verdict, or an improper jury instruction, for example.
The error is manifest and manifestly prejudicial, justifying either outright reversal
or at least remand. Substantive injustice will result from refusing to consider the
error on the basis that it is not within the scope of review. On the other hand,
subversion of the adversarial system, of the trial court's processes, and of the
appellee's rightful expectation that only error properly signaled in the trial court
can jeopardize the judgment in his favor, will result if the case is reversed or
remanded because of the error."
This is the problem in its classic, albeit narrow and specific, form. To recognize it is to say about all that can be said about the appropriate response, except to
insist that even in confronting the problem in the simplest of forms, the working
hypothesis originally proposed should be followed: the costs and benefits of
achieving the just result should be carefully weighed.
B.

Seizing the Opportunity for Needed Declaration of Principle

The impulse to depart from the formal design in order to announce a legal
principle arises from an anomaly at the heart of our system of appellate review as
it has evolved. The declarative, legislative function of appellate courts can only be
rightly exercised as a by-product of their more mundane corrective function. This
is ensured by both the scope-limiting rules under discussion here and, more profoundly, by case or controversy, mootness, standing, and related criteria. In conjunction, these ordain that principle can only be declared, changed, or clarified in
the course of considering specific trial court actions properly assigned as error by a
truly interested litigant in a controversy still alive at the time of appellate decision.
The declarative function of appellate courts is thus dependent upon a random
pathology in the trial processes and by chance factors that are quite beyond the
power of those courts to control, except preventively.i2
This problem on occasion causes an appellate court to reach out in disregard of
the scope-limiting design (or other limiting rules) 13 to make what it perceives to be
a critically important declaration of principle. Whether this is done primarily to
order the further course of proceedings upon remand, or for general precedential
purposes, the impulse to depart from design in such cases raises our basic problem
11. For examples of abandonment of the scope-limiting design to avoid an unjust result, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (19 76)(error not presented to Supreme Court); United States v. The
Barge Shamrock, 635 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981) (new theory
presented on appeal); MacEdward v. Northern Elec. Co., 595 F.2d 105, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1979)(error not
assigned at trial or on appeal).
12. This is a particularly ironic circumstance for those who would rate the declarative function as the
more important of the two. See, e.g., Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword The Forms ofjustice, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979).
13. For example, a concurring opinion in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59 (1978), argued that standing and ripeness limits were disregarded by the majority. Id at 95 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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in its most complex and institutionally significant form. Here, disregard of design
may be thought most respectable for the very reason that it serves that other basic
function of the appellate courts. Consequently, it may be that departure from
design occurs here most casually, frequently without deep concern for the values
necessarily subverted, and ordinarily without the court's feeling the need specifically to justify the deed in its written opinion. But of course the design's values are
as completely subverted when this is the primary reason for departure as when
that reason is narrowly to avoid an unjust result in the particular case. And
although it cannot be demonstrated, the suspicion may be ventured that many
departures from design undertaken for this reason could not be justified solely on
the basis of the need to avoid a specific unjust result.
The variations on this particular theme are too many for comprehensive
survey, but two basic patterns can serve to illustrate the process at work. These
patterns may represent the circumstances in which appellate courts chafe most
frequently under the constraints imposed on their declarative function by the
scope-limiting design. Each could be said to involve a court armed with a principle
in search of a case. In the first, the case can be made suitable for declaration of the
principle only by drawing on a legal/factual theory not considered in the trial
court; in the second, only by applying the principle to a less than satisfactorily
developed factual record.
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 14 provides an interesting illustration of the first pattern. The case is of course remembered for the principle it declared. But the way
it was declared is the subject here explored. It will be recalled that both parties on
appeal agreed that Swi v. Tyson 15 applied, and contended only over its proper
application.' 6 But the opinion opened by stating that "[t]he question for decision
is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swi/2 v. Tyson shall now be disapproved,"1 7 and then proceeded to disapprove the doctrine and give us in its place
that mysterious conflicts principle whose time, ready or not, had come. The
departure in Erie from scope-limiting design, with consequent subversion of litigation and system values, did not go unnoticed at the time-Justice Butler in plaintive dissent remarked the fact.' 8 Significantly, however, the majority recorded no
concern that its approach might have created any problem and attempted no justification for the exercise. Who now remembers the dissent?
A more recent Supreme Court case illustrates the second pattern. Estelle V.
Gamble 19 started with apro se complaint by a state prisoner alleging under section
198320 a violation of his eighth amendment rights by the failure of state prison
officials and the prison medical director to attend to his medical needs following
an injury. The district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
Erie, 304 U.S. at 82 (Butler, J., dissenting).
Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).
Id at 82.
429 U.S. 97 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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a claim. 2 1 The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the complaint but without definitive elaboration of controlling substantive
principle. 22 Still on no record but the inartfully drawn pro se complaint, the
Supreme Court took the occasion to announce the "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs" standard for such claims 2 3 and, applying it to the complaint, reversed as to the medical director but remanded to the court of appeals for
the application of the new principle to the attempted statement of claim against
other officials. As in Erie, a lone dissenter voiced concern for the possible subversion of system values resulting from this first-instance appellate declaration of legal
principle on so meager and questionable a record from a trial court where neither
fact nor legal theory had been first put to test. Justice Stevens suggested that when
confronted with a trial court's dismissal of a complaint attempting to state a novel
claim, an appellate court might well decline to announce new principle and simply
remand for factual development in the trial court, because the actual facts as there
24
determined might reveal that no declaration of new principle was required.
There is of course much to be said for the majority actions and dissenting views
in both Erie and Gamble. What can be insisted upon in any event is the obligation
of appellate judges to consider seriously the conflicting values that led good judges
in both of these cases to disagree on so fundamental an issue relating to the exercise
25
of appellate power.
C.

The Mechanism:

"Plain and Fundamental Error"

The established formula or ritual for breaking through design in order to correct error not properly suggested at trial or assigned on appeal is to call it "plain"
or "fundamental. ' 26 Being "plain" or "fundamental," its consideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and this presumably justifies any resulting sub21. 429 U.S. at 98.
22. Id
23. Id at 104.
24. Id at 112 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. For other examples of courts confronting this problem, see Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941),
where the Court clarified the power to issue a contempt order (under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure) for failure to submit to a physical examination, and overturned the district court's contempt
order, which was not assigned as error, by noticing the "fundamental error" of the order; In re Liberatore,
574 F.2d 78, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1978), where the court took the opportunity to clarify a procedural issue that
was not presented below; United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 440-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
where the court refined and modified the district court's legal standard for suits involving defective
automobiles but noted the danger, in adopting a new theory, of denying the opposing party the opportunity to present facts material to the new theory; Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons, 405 F.2d 1061, 1062-63
(4th Cir. 1969), where the court decided that the federal standard for "sufficiency of evidence to go to the
jury" applies in diversity suits, even though this issue was not technically before the court.
26. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976); United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 635
F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. demed, 454 U.S. 830 (1981); MacEdward v. Northern Elec. Co., 595
F.2d 105, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1979),
Plain or fundamental error is undoubtedly and understandably invoked more readily in criminal than
in civil cases. See Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 718 (1962)(per curiam); United States v. Pepe, 512
F.2d 1135, 1137 (3d Cir. 1975).
Plain error is "plainer" when a pertinent statute was overlooked in the trial court. Ricard v. Birch, 529
F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1975).
A court may more readily notice plain error when the case is to be remanded in any event. Noticing
the error may avoid its repetition on retrial. Harris v. Smith, 372 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1967).
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version of litigation and system values. 27
An appellate court effectively sets its course in this whole matter by the way it
administers its "plain error" rule. Inevitably, different philosophies about the relative importance of the underlying values dictate how "plain" an error must be for
a particular court to notice it. Judicial attitudes clearly cover the spectrum on this
matter. Indeed, at least one appellate court, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
has abolished the plain error rule and adheres to the formal design as a matter of
general policy. 28 Presumably this represents a considered judgment that the litigation and system values protected by the design outweigh any countervailing values
in achieving just results in particular cases or in being able to declare needed prin29
ciple by departing from design in appropriate cases.
VI
A

SPECIAL PROBLEM OF SCOPE: ISSUES PRESENTED BY (OR
CONSIDERED IN BEHALF OF) APPELLEES

In the paradigmatic two-party lawsuit, one party wins a complete victory, and
the other, as the only aggrieved party, appeals. Following the formal design, the
scope of review is determined by the errors properly assigned by the appellant.
The appellee's sole interest is to defend his judgment against the various assignments of error, and he consequently has no interest in having the scope of review
broadened beyond that defined by the appellant. Although error potentially prejudicing him may well have occurred at trial, it has been washed out in his
favorable judgment, and any interest in that error becomes completely academic.
This however is not the only litigation pattern and consequently not the only

way in which the scope of review may be determined. Even in two-party litigation
both parties may be clearly aggrieved by the judgment. In such a case both, by
taking appeal, may assign errors which in combination set the scope of review.
Still, in this pattern as well, neither party has an interest in broadening the scope
27. In Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941), the Court stated:
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends ofjustice, not to defeat them. A rigid
and undeviating judicially declared practice under which courts of review would invariably and under
all circumstances decline to consider all questions which had not previously been specifically urged
would be out of harmony with this policy. Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the
rules of fundamental justice.
Id. at 557.
28. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 260, 322 A.2d 114, 117 (1974)(civil case);
Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 421-22, 326 A.2d 272, 273-74 (1974) (criminal case).
29. Plain or fundamental error is the most prevalent mechanism for avoiding scope-limiting rules, but
it is not the exclusive mechanism. Occasionally, other rationales are used to break through the formal
design.
When questions of public policy are involved or public funds are at stake it becomes easier to break
through the formal design. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 656, 662 n. 10 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)(public policy concerning price of natural gas); Platis v. United States, 409 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th
Cir. 1969)(public monies at stake in a Federal Tort Claims Act case).
The scope of review may be expanded if the trial court contributed to the failure to preserve or present
an error for review. United States v. Wright, 542 F.2d 975, 985 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073
(1977) (trial court affirmatively misled counsel about the proper form of objections); Industrial Dev. Bd. v.
Fuqua Indus., Inc., 523 F.2d 1226, 1237-38 (5th Cir. 1975)(trial court failed to comprehend theory
presented by plaintiff).
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of review past that set by the cross-assignments of error by the two partiesappellant.
Occasionally, however, it appears on appeal that although an appellee's judgment (or a favorable part thereof) cannot be affirmed on the basis used in the trial
court, it could be affirmed or at least saved from outright reversal on a different
basis. This alternative basis may have been advanced and rejected in the trial
court or it may never have been considered there. In the first instance, it can be
seen that the trial court's error in rejecting the alternative basis, although apparently mooted in the judgment for the appellee, has now emerged as prejudicial.
Should the scope of review be broadened to include consideration of this potentially dispositive error? In the second instance, it is not accurate to charge the trial
court with any error which might now be assigned nuncpro tunc. However, should
not this appellee stand in at least as good a position as the appellant in whose
behalf a theory not advanced in the trial court is considered as a basis for reversing
or vacating a judgment?
The answer to both of these questions is'a hesitant and imprecise "yes." It is
implicit in the general judicial rule that an appellate court may affirm a judgment
on any basis that finds support in the record. 30 Some courts applying the rule,
however, seem not to realize that it is a scope-expanding rule that calls for exactly
the same weighing of conflicting values called for when formal design is broken
through in behalf of appellants. To notice an error or theory that deprived an
appellee of an alternative basis upon which his judgment might have been supported when that error or theory was not suggested below or formally presented on
appeal involves precisely the same departure from design that occurs in the more
common situation where such error disfavoring an appellant is noticed. Here, too,
the costs of departure from design should be weighed before applying this generally salutary rule.
One final twist to this particular problem should be noted. The reach of the
general rule that a judgment may be upheld on any basis supportable on the
record is limited to "upholding." A corollary rule states that it does not extend to
enlarging or otherwise modifying a judgment in a way that favors the appellee or
disfavors the appellant. 3 1 If the court is to do more than merely uphold the judgment below, the appellee must have enlarged the scope of review by taking a crossappeal. The distinction was tersely put by Mr. Justice Brandeis in United States V.
American Railway Express Co. 32 There the plaintiff had sought an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of an ICC order. The district court granted the injunction on the stated ground that a controlling ICC statute precluded the issuance of
30. See, r.g., Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 585 n.24 (1982).
The Supreme Court has given as the reason for the rule that a remand would be wasteful when the
correct decision has already been reached. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). Appellate courts
may be drawing here on the principles embodied in Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(empowering the district court to allow trial of issues not raised in the pleadings and amendment of pleadings to conform with evidence adduced and issues raised at trial) as the source of their power to conform
the theory of recovery to the record in the case.
31. See, e.g., Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263, 1272-73 (5th Cir.), cerl. dented, 456 U.S. 975
(1982).
32. 265 U.S. 425 (1924).
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such an order.33 On appeal the plaintiff as appellee urged as additional grounds
for affirmance that the order was unconstitutional, and in any event unreasonable. 34 In holding it proper to consider these alternative bases for affirmance, the
Court opined:
[T]he appellee may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights
thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary, whether what he seeks is to correct an
error or to supplement the decree with respect to a matter not dealt with below. But it is
likewise settled that the appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a
decree any matter appearing in the record, although his argument may involve an attack
upon the
reasoning of the lower court or an insistence upon matter overlooked or ignored
35
by it.

Unfortunately, it is not always clear whether an appellee seeks by expanding
the scope of review merely to uphold the judgment or to enlarge it. The resulting
difficulty poses one of the most vexing conceptual problems encountered in appellate procedure. Fortunately it is a problem not too frequently encountered. Consequently, there has not been a great deal of systematic analysis of the close-case
problem either by the courts or commentators. 36 A case that illustrates the type of
close question that can be presented is Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Roberts. 37
There the plaintiff sought in the trial court a declaration of noncoverage under an
insurance policy issued to defendant. The defendant contended, inter alia, that he
was covered by the policy, that the plaintiff was estopped to deny coverage, and
that the policy should be reformed to provide coverage as intended by the parties. 38 The trial court entered judgment for defendant on the basis of the estoppel
theory. 39 On appeal by the plaintiff, the defendant sought to urge all three
grounds in support of the judgment. The court held that, without having taken a
cross-appeal, he could urge coverage of the policy and of course estoppel, but not
reformation. 40 The court stated that "appellees' contentions as to reformation of
the policy . . . seek to change or to add to the relief accorded by the judgment
. ... "41

There was no indication, however, of what change reformation would

effect .42
33. Id at 430.
34, Id at 434-35.
35, Id. at 435 (footnote omitted).
36. For further discussion of this problem, see Stern, When to Cross-Appeal or Cross-Pettlzon-Certabinyor
Confuszon?, 87 HARV. L. REv. 763 (1974); Note, FederalJur aiction and Procedure-Review of Errors at the
Instance of a Non-Appealing Party, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1058 (1938).
37. 132 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1942).
38. Id at 795.
39. Id
40. Id at 795-96.
41. Id at 795.
42. Another case that illustrates the close question of whether appellee is seeking affirmance or expansion of the judgment is Phillips v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 657 F.2d 554 (3d Cir.
1981). There the plaintiffs brought an action challenging the defendant's practice of suing in a distant
forum to collect on defaulted student loans. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's practice violated
due process and Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. The trial court
accepted the due process claim but rejected the unfair trade practices claim. In support of their judgment
on appeal the plaintiffs again asserted the unfair trade practices claim. The court refused to consider the
unfair trade practices claim absent a cross-appeal because acceptance of the claim would have required
enlarging the judgment. The Unfair Trade Practices Act specifically provided for minimum nondiscre-
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VII
CONCLUSION:

SOFTENING THE IMPACT OF NONADHERENCE
TO DESIGN

For purposes of analysis, this paper has presented the problem of adherence or
nonadherence to the formal design for controlling scope of review in a rather simplistic way which may suggest that the only alternatives once a problem is
presented are to adhere to design or not to adhere. Of course, the matter is not
that simple. There are usually middle-ground alternatives available to the properly concerned court. For example, a failure on appeal to assign an error or
advance a theory that was properly noted or advanced at trial can be handled by
directing reargument or rehearing. In terms of our analysis, this protects most of
the litigation and system values embodied in the formal design, and at relatively
small cost in other values. Remands for reconsideration on reopened records frequently serve to ensure the development of the adequate factual record necessary
to permit responsible clarification or disapproval of existing principle. Even these
approaches, of course, involve trade-offs between the conflicting values; the point is
simply that there are usually alternatives.
This suggests an appropriate closing note. Only that court properly mindful of
the conflicting values involved when the formal design is threatened is likely to
43
choose the best alternative.

tionary statutory damages. Even though the plaintiffs were willing to waive the damages, the court refused
to consider the claim, holding that the damages were not waivable. Id at 566-68.
43. Many cases undoubtedly reflect sub s'leniw exercises of exactly that sort of informed choice. See,
e.g., Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937). In both of these
cases the Supreme Court applied a new theory but in the interest of fairness remanded the cases to afford
an opportunity to present additional evidence relevant to the new theory. See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 560
Gowran, 302 U.S. at 247.

